Neural Plasticity and Consciousness by Mads Jensen & Morten Overgaard
Neural plasticity and consciousness
Mads Jensen* and Morten Overgaard
Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit, Hammel Neurorehabilitation and Research Center, Aarhus University Hospital, Aarhus, Denmark
*Correspondence: mads@cnru.dk
Neural plasticity has, despite a growing 
interest in neuroscience over the last dec-
ades, received little interest in conscious-
ness research. This might be because 
neural plasticity has no clear and strict 
definition; it is used to describe the abil-
ity of neuronal tissue to adjust activities 
and physical characteristics in order to 
adapt to changes in the environment or 
changes in their use – in relation to, e.g., 
behavioral patterns, cognition, or meta-
bolic demands. The term traces back in 
history and was discussed by William 
James (1910–1942) and Ramón y Cajal 
(1852–1934) who provided evidence to 
argue for local plasticity in structure and 
function in otherwise fixed neural circuits.
Neural plasticity covers a number of 
different types of changes in brain tis-
sue or organization, which arguably can 
be described at a high or a low level and 
at different time scales. At “lower” levels 
of description, a very simple example of 
plasticity is facilitation, i.e., the increase in 
amplitude of a postsynaptic potential after 
rapid activations from other, presynaptic 
neurons. Long-term potentiation (LTP), 
being the persistency of the postsynaptic 
potential after the facilitating stimulus has 
subsided, may lead to increased postsyn-
aptic activities for days. Other examples of 
“low level processes” that could be men-
tioned are, changes in individual neurons 
or small circuits involve synaptogenesis (the 
creation of individual or groups of synapses 
to build connections between neurons) and 
neuronal migration (where neurons “travel” 
to become part of circuits distant from their 
site of “birth”).
At a “higher” level of description, reor-
ganizations related to changes in cognition 
may be investigated. In cognitive neurosci-
ence, an impressive amount of evidence 
suggests a functional localization of men-
tal phenomena in the brain, so that differ-
ent cognitive and emotional functions are 
associated with specific networks or regions 
of the brain (e.g., Frackowiak et al., 2003). 
Functional reorganization involves a change 
in how, for example, a specific cognitive 
function is realized in the brain. Such a 
change will in some instances be the result 
of neural repair mechanisms following an 
injury to the brain. In such cases, functional 
reorganizations will typically be considered 
cases of functional recovery where a wide 
range of functions (e.g., language) seem-
ingly are realized in different brain regions 
after injury to regions previously associ-
ated with the function (Overgaard and 
Mogensen, 2011).
The concept of consciousness is even 
more complicated and has even more dif-
ferent interpretations than the concept of 
neural plasticity. We, like several others in 
this field of research, take the concept to 
mean subjective or phenomenal experience. 
One primary question very frequently asked 
among those interested in consciousness is 
which specific neural regions or networks 
that are necessary and/or sufficient for a 
person to be conscious. This is referred to 
as the neural correlate of consciousness 
(NCC).
The NCC is traditionally defined as 
“the minimal set of neuronal events and 
mechanisms jointly sufficient for a specific 
conscious percept” (Koch, 2004, p. 16) or 
“A neural system N is an NCC if the state 
of N correlates directly with states of con-
sciousness” (Chalmers, 2000, p. 18). At a 
first look, such a statement claims noth-
ing more than a neural system N at a given 
point in time correlates directly with states 
of consciousness. However, we assume the 
claim is intended to be stronger than that, 
namely that an NCC in some fundamental 
aspects is the same over time and between 
individuals. In other words, the NCC for a 
conscious experience X is not just the NCC 
at a time – it is the NCC at any time.
Research on neural plasticity can be 
taken to imply that a simple one-to-one 
mapping between brain structure and 
mental phenomenon might not be an 
optimal strategy in the attempt to reveal 
the neural underpinnings of conscious-
ness. If it proves to be the case that “one 
and the same”  mental state may be related 
to several different physical processes, an 
explanation should rather look for com-
mon factors among different sufficient 
“realisers” of consciousness than it would 
merely identify brain regions.
A classical interpretation of the relation 
between conscious experience (qualia) 
and brain processes has been that qualia 
are determined by the brain activity, such 
that if the brain activity had been different 
then the conscious experience would have 
been different as well. Such an interpreta-
tion, in the light of research on neural plas-
ticity, seems very difficult. Rather, research 
on neural plasticity seems more in support 
of a weaker view on localization, arguing 
that mechanisms or cognitive structure is 
“realized in” brain activity or brain struc-
ture, which is not restricted to a certain 
localization.
The concept of neural plasticity cap-
tures a diverse and complex range of phe-
nomena, as argued above, with different 
levels of explanation. The integration of 
theories about neural plasticity at differ-
ent levels and theories of consciousness 
is therefore complex, carrying impor-
tant implications for the plausibility of 
any conception of the relationship of 
consciousness and brain processes. With 
this introductory paper, we hope to start 
an otherwise neglected debate, unfolded 
in the Special Topic “Consciousness and 
Neural Plasticity.”
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